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McKEE, Chief Judge 
 Lisa Lupyan appeals the summary judgment rendered 
in favor of her former employer, Corinthian Colleges, Inc. 
(“CCI”) on her claims of interference with the exercise of her 
rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA,” or 
“Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq; and retaliation for her 
exercise of those rights.  After a thorough review of the 
record, we conclude that genuine issues of fact remain as to 
her FMLA claims.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I.  Factual & Procedural History 
 
 Lupyan was hired as an instructor in CCI’s Applied 
Science Management program in 2004.   In December 2007, 
Lupyan’s supervisor, James Thomas, noticed that she seemed 
depressed and suggested she take a personal leave of absence.  
Appx. I at 25.  On her Request for Leave Form, Lupyan 
specified that she was taking “personal leave” from 
December 4, 2007 through December 31, 2007.  Appx. I at 
26.  However, Thomas suggested that she apply for short-
term disability coverage instead.  Appx. II at 10.  
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Accordingly, Lupyan scheduled an appointment with her 
doctor and received a “Certification of Health Provider,” a 
standard Department of Labor (“DOL”) form for providing 
certification of a mental health condition.  Based on this 
document, CCI’s human resources department determined 
that Lupyan was eligible for leave under the FMLA, rather 
than personal leave.   
 
 On December 19, 2007, Sherri Hixson, CCI’s 
Supervisor of Administration, met with Lupyan and 
instructed her to initial the box marked “Family Medical 
Leave” on her Request for Leave Form.  Hixson also changed 
Lupyan’s projected date of return to April 1, 2008, based 
upon the Certification of Health Provider provided by 
Lupyan.  Appx. I at 26.  Lupyan contends—and CCI does not 
dispute —that her rights under the FMLA were never 
discussed during this meeting.  However, later that afternoon 
CCI allegedly mailed Lupyan a letter advising her that her 
leave was designated as FMLA leave, and further explaining 
her rights under that Act (the “Letter”).  Lupyan denies ever 
having received the Letter, and denies having any knowledge 
that she was on FMLA leave until she attempted to return to 
work.  The issue of whether Lupyan received the Letter is 
central to this appeal.  
 
 On March 13, 2008, Lupyan advised CCI that she had 
been released by her doctor to return to her teaching position 
with certain restrictions.  On April 1, 2008, Thomas informed 
Lupyan that she could not come back to work if  any 
restrictions were a condition of her return. Appx. I at 27.  
Shortly thereafter, Lupyan provided Thomas with a full 
release from her psychiatrist.  This confirmed that she was 
able to return to work without any restrictions or 
accommodations.  Nonetheless, Lupyan was advised on April 
9, 2008 that she was being terminated from her position at 
CCI due to low student enrollment, and because she had not 
returned to work within the twelve weeks allotted for FMLA 
leave.  Id. at 27.  Lupyan claims this was the first time she 
had any knowledge that she was on FMLA leave.  Appx. II at 
9.  
 
 Thereafter, Lupyan brought the instant action. She 
alleges that that CCI interfered with her rights under the 
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FMLA by failing to give notice that her leave fell under that 
Act, and  that she was fired in retaliation for taking FMLA 
leave.  The District Court granted CCI’s initial motion for 
summary judgment as to both claims.  Thereafter, the District 
Court sua sponte reversed its ruling on Lupyan’s FMLA 
interference claim.   The court recognized that summary 
judgment was not appropriate because there was a factual 
dispute regarding whether CCI had informed Lupyan of her 
FMLA rights.  Appx. I at 43-45.  CCI responded with an 
amended summary judgment motion which included 
affidavits from CCI employees who testified that the Letter 
was properly mailed to Lupyan.  Based on the affidavits, the 
District Court relied on the evidentiary presumption that 
arises under the “mailbox rule” and found that Lupyan had 
received the Letter.  The Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of CCI, and this appeal followed.  
 
II.  Discussion 
 
We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final 
order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1331.  
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
order granting summary judgment.  Justofin v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 517, 521 (3d Cir. 2004).  We apply the 
same standard as the district court.  We affirm pursuant to 
Federal Rule 56(c) if “there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.” Id.  A factual dispute is 
material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under 
governing law.  Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citing Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 
1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
 
A.  The Family Medical Leave Act 
 
 Congress passed the FMLA in 1993 in an attempt “to 
balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of 
families.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).   The FMLA enables 
“employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons,” Id. 
§ 2601(b)(2).  However, Congress recognized the needs of 
employers by requiring that all such leave be taken “in a 
manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of 
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employers,” Id. § 2601(b)(3).  The FMLA entitles eligible 
employees to take twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-
month period for the employee’s own “serious health 
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the 
functions” of his or her job.  See 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(D).  
Following this period of leave, an employee has the right to 
be restored to his or her original position or its equivalent.  Id. 
§ 2614(a)(1).  When an employee cannot perform an essential 
function of his or her original position due to the 
“continuation of a serious health condition,” no right to 
restoration exists.  29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c). 
 
 The FMLA creates a cause of action for interference 
with the rights it bestows. Employees can sue for interference 
with the exercise of FMLA rights under 29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a)(1).  They can also sue under 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(2), 
if an employer retaliates against an employee for exercising 
her FMLA rights.  See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 
F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2009)  (“[F]iring an employee for a 
valid request for FMLA leave may constitute interference 
with the employee’s FMLA rights as well as retaliation 
against the employee.”).   
 
1. Notice Requirements 
 
 The FMLA requires employers to provide employees 
with both general and individual notice about the FMLA.  To 
meet the general notice requirements, an employer must post 
a notice of FMLA rights on its premises.  See § 2619(a).  
Because employers have some discretion in the way FMLA 
policies are implemented,  
employers must also include information regarding the 
employer’s FMLA policies in a handbook or similar 
publication.  See 29 CFR § 825.300. 
 
 In addition, regulations issued by the Department of 
Labor require that an employer give employees individual 
written notice that an absence falls under the FMLA, and is 
therefore governed by it.  29 CFR § 825.208; Conoshenti v. 
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“the regulations require employers to provide 
employees with individualized notice of their FMLA rights 
and obligations.”).  Thus, once an employer is on notice that 
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an employee is taking FMLA-qualifying leave, the employer 
must: (1) within five business days notify the employee of his 
or her eligibility to take FMLA leave, 29 C.F.R. § 
825.300(b)(1); (2) notify the employee in writing whether the 
leave will be designated as FMLA leave, 29 C.F.R. § 
825.300(d)(1); (3) provide written notice detailing the 
employee’s obligations under the FMLA and explaining any 
consequences for failing to meet those obligations, § 
825.300(c)(1); and (4) notify the employee of the specific 
amount of leave that will be counted against the employee’s 
FMLA leave entitlement, § 825.300(d)(6).  
 
2. Interference Claims 
 
 The FMLA’s requirement that employers inform 
employees of their rights under the Act is intended “to ensure 
that employers allow their employees to make informed 
decisions about leave.”  Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 144 (citing 
Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 377, 379-
80 (D.N.J. 2001)).  Failure to provide the required notice can 
constitute an interference claim.  Id. at 144-145.  
 
 However, an employer’s failure to properly notify an 
employee of her FMLA rights does not necessarily prevent 
the employee from claiming that her leave is covered by the 
FMLA.  See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 
U.S. 81, 82 (2002) (no relief under § 2615(a)(1) “unless the 
employee has been prejudiced by the violation”).  Prejudice 
occurs when the employer’s failure to advise the plaintiff of 
her FMLA rights “rendered h[er] unable to exercise [the right 
to leave] in a meaningful way, thereby causing injury.”  
Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 143; see also Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 
89.     
 
 Here, Lupyan claims that CCI interfered with her 
FMLA rights by not informing her that her leave was under 
the FMLA. According to her, she therefore was unaware of 
the requirement that she had to return to work within twelve 
weeks or be subject to termination.  As noted above, the 
District Court ultimately entered summary judgment in CCI’s 
favor on this issue based upon its conclusion that CCI 
provided adequate notice of Lupyan’s FMLA rights via the 
Letter.  The court also relied on provisions of  CCI’s 
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employee handbook which contains a description of an 
employee’s rights under the FMLA.1  However, the 
description in an employee handbook can only satisfy the 
FMLA’s general notice requirements.  See 29 CFR § 
825.208.  Even if we assume arguendo that Lupyan’s receipt 
of a properly descriptive handbook provided the general 
notice under the Act, that would not resolve the issue before 
us.  Given Lupyan’s claim that she did not receive the Letter 
that CCI claims was properly mailed to her, we must decide 
whether the District Court properly afforded CCI the benefit 
of the presumption of receipt of properly mailed letters that 
arises under the “mailbox rule.”  It is clear that if CCI has 
established Lupyan’s receipt of the Letter, CCI has shown 
that it satisfied the employer’s obligation to provide actual 
notice under the FMLA. 
 
B.   The Mailbox Rule 
 
1. Presumption of Receipt 
  
 The presumption of receipt derives from the 
longstanding common law “mailbox rule.”  Under the 
mailbox rule, if a letter “properly directed is proved to have 
been either put into the post-office or delivered to the 
postman, it is presumed . . . that it reached its destination at 
the regular time, and was received by the person to whom it 
was addressed.”  Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 
(1884); Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n.-Int’l Longshoremen’s 
Ass’n Pension Fund v. C.I.R., 523 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 
2008).   
 
 However, this “is not a conclusive presumption of 
law.”  Rosenthal, 111 U.S. at 193-94 (citations omitted).   
Rather, it is a rebuttable “inference of fact founded on the 
probability that the officers of the government will do their 
duty and the usual course of business.”  Id. (noting that when 
the presumption of mailing is “opposed by evidence that the 
                                              
1
 According to the record before the District Court, the 
handbook explains a CCI employee’s rights with regard to 
FMLA leave.  Lupyan’s CCI employee file contains a 
“Receipt of Employee Handbook” form signed by Lupyan on 
June 21, 2004.   
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letters never were received,” it must be weighed “by the jury 
in determining the question whether the letters were actually 
received or not.”).   
 
 A “strong presumption” of receipt applies when notice 
is sent by certified mail, because it creates actual evidence of 
delivery in the form of a receipt.  Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y 
Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  A 
“weaker presumption” arises where delivery is sent via 
regular mail, for which no receipt, or other proof of delivery, 
is generated.  Id.  In the absence of actual proof of delivery, 
receipt can be proven circumstantially by introducing 
evidence of business practices or office customs pertaining to 
mail.  United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 893 (3d Cir. 
1994).  This evidence may be in the form of a sworn 
statement.  Id. at 895; Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 
F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2007) (“a sworn statement is credible 
evidence of mailing for the purposes of the mailbox rule.”).  
However, because the presumption is weak where proof of 
receipt is attempted solely by circumstantial evidence, we 
require the affiant to have “personal knowledge” of the 
procedures in place at the time of the mailing.  Kyhn v. 
Shinseki, 716 F.3d 572, 574 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
 As noted earlier, CCI amended its motion for summary 
judgment to take advantage of the mailbox rule and thereby 
establish that Lupyan had actual notice of her FMLA rights.  
CCI submitted the affidavits of Evan Gwynne, CCI’s 
Mailroom Supervisor, and Anne Binns, CCl’s Human 
Resources Coordinator, both of whom had personal 
knowledge of CCI’s customary mailing practices when the 
Letter was allegedly mailed to Lupyan.  Moreover, Binns 
swore that she personally prepared the Letter and placed it in 
the outgoing mail bin.  App. Br. at 6.   
 
 However, CCI provided no corroborating evidence that 
Lupyan received the Letter.  The Letter was not sent by 
registered or certified mail, nor did CCI request a return 
receipt or use any of the now common ways of assigning a 
tracking number to the Letter.  Therefore, there is no direct 
evidence of either receipt or non-receipt.  See Estate of Wood 
v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1155, 1161 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting 
that a postmark could present irrefutable evidence of 
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mailing).  Instead, the only evidence CCI submitted consists 
of self-serving affidavits signed nearly four years after the 
alleged mailing date.  See Affidavit of Anne Binns, Appx. III 
at 26-30.  These affidavits implicate the presumption of 
receipt that arises under the mailbox rule.  However, under 
the circumstances, it is a very weak presumption.  Given 
Lupyan’s denial, and the ease with which a letter can be 
certified, tracked, or proof of receipt obtained, that weak 
rebuttable presumption is not sufficient to establish receipt as 
a matter of law and thereby entitle CCI to summary judgment. 
 
2. Rebutting the Presumption of Receipt 
 
 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, once a party proves 
mailing, the presumption of receipt “imposes the burden of 
production on the party against whom it is directed[.]”  
McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 287 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Federal Rule Evidence 301 provides the default 
rule for how presumptions operate in federal civil cases.  
Specifically, the party the presumption operates against has 
the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption, 
while the actual burden of persuasion remains does not 
change.  McCann, 458 F.3d at 287.  Under this “bursting 
bubble” theory, the “‘introduction of evidence to rebut a 
presumption destroys that presumption, leaving only that 
evidence and its inferences to be judged against the 
competing evidence and its inferences to determine the 
ultimate question at issue.’”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 287-88 
(quoting McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 829-30 
(3d Cir. 1994).   
 
 Moreover, the “quantum of evidence” needed to burst 
an evidentiary presumption’s bubble in a civil case is 
“minimal.”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 288.   “[T]he presumption’s 
only effect is to require the party [contesting it] to produce 
enough evidence substantiating [the presumed fact’s absence] 
to withstand a motion for summary judgment or judgment as 
a matter of law on the issue.”  Id.  Accordingly, a single, non-
conclusory affidavit or witness’s testimony, when based on 
personal knowledge and directed at a material issue, is 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment.  See, e.g., Kirleis v. 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161-63 (3d 
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Cir. 2009).  This remains true even if the affidavit is “self-
serving.”2  Id.   
 
 Accordingly, under Rule 301, Lupyan’s contention 
that she had no notice that her leave was subject to the 
limitations of the FMLA because she never received CCI’s 
Letter, sufficiently burst the mailbox rule’s presumption, to 
require a jury to determine the credibility of her testimony, as 
well as that of CCI’s witnesses.  The District Court therefore 
erred in rejecting Lupyan’s affidavit as a matter of law based 
on her inability to corroborate her claim that she never 
received the Letter from CCI.  Appx. I at 4.  
 
 Lupyan argues that her testimony alone, if credited by 
the factfinder, should be sufficient to rebut the presumption 
she received the Letter.  We recently adopted this position in 
a suit under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).  Cappuccio 
v. Prime Capital Funding LLC, 649 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 
2011).  There, the District Court instructed the jury that “[i]n 
a TILA case, something more than just the testimony of the 
borrower is needed to rebut the presumption that she received 
two copies of the Notice” of her right to rescind her 
mortgage.  Cappuccio, 649 F.3d at 189.  We reversed.  We 
held that “the testimony of a borrower alone,” that she did not 
receive the requisite notice, was “sufficient to overcome 
TILA’s presumption of receipt.”  Id. at 190.  We reasoned 
that the plaintiff’s testimony related directly to a material 
issue in her TILA claim, and was based on her personal 
knowledge.  Id.  Accordingly, her testimony overcame the 
presumption, leaving to the jury “the decision of whether to 
credit her testimony, or that of [defendant’s] witnesses[,]” 
who testified that the requisite notices were sent.  Cappuccio, 
649 F.3d at 190; Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 161-63.   
                                              
2
  As with any other kind of evidence, the declarant’s interest 
in the outcome is merely one factor for the ultimate finder of 
fact to weigh in determining the reliability of the evidence. It 
is not a reason to automatically reject the evidence. Indeed, 
the testimony of a litigant will almost always be self serving 
since few litigants will knowingly volunteer statements that 
are prejudicial to their case. However that has never meant 
that a litigant’s evidence must be categorically rejected by the 
fact finder.  
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 There is no meaningful distinction between the 
circumstances in Cappuccio, and the circumstances here.  
Cappuccio applied the widely-accepted interpretation of Rule 
301 that “‘the introduction of evidence to rebut a presumption 
destroys the presumption . . . .’”  Id. at 189  (quoting 
McCann, 458 F.3d at 287-88).  Although we recognized that 
Congress could impose a more stringent burden to rebut a 
presumption under Rule 301, our holding was not based on 
anything in the TILA.  Id. at 190.   Similarly, there is no 
language in the FMLA or its regulations that suggests a 
legislative intent to create a stronger presumption there than 
would otherwise apply in under Rule 301.  Accordingly, we 
hold that evidence sufficient to nullify the presumption of 
receipt under the mailbox rule may consist solely of the 
addressee’s positive denial of receipt, creating an issue of fact 
for the jury.   
 
 We recognize that, at the summary judgment stage, the 
mailbox rule can be an efficient tool “for determining, in the 
face of inconclusive evidence, whether or not receipt has 
actually been accomplished.”  Schikore v. Bank America 
Supplemental Retirement Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 
2001); see also Phila. Marine Trade, 523 F.3d at 147.  
However, the mailbox rule has never been an “immutable 
legal command.”  Laborers’ International, 594 F.3d 732, 738 
(10th Cir. 2010).  Rather, it is simply an evidentiary 
presumption, based on the historic efficiency of the United 
States Postal Service, that letters will be timely delivered to 
the addressee when properly mailed.  See Rosenthal, 111 U.S. 
at 193.  However, there has never been a claim that the postal 
service has obtained perfection or that it is infallible.  Indeed, 
this case highlights an inherent flaw in this long-standing 
presumption: that the risk of non-delivery falls squarely on 
the shoulders of the intended recipient.  Where, as here, 
receipt of a letter is a contested issue, the individual recipient 
is forced to prove a negative.  The law has long recognized 
that such an evidentiary feat is next to impossible.  See 
Piedmont and Arlington Life-Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 92 U.S. 377, 
380 (1875) (“While it may be easy enough to prove the 
affirmative of [a] question[], it is next to impossible to prove 
the negative”).   
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 When the intended recipient is a commercial or legal 
entity, it may be routine business practice to log incoming 
mail.  In such cases, the absence of an entry in a mail log near 
the time that mail would likely have arrived, can be used to 
establish that mail was not received.  See United States v. 
Dawson, 608 F.2d 1038, 1040 (5th Cir. 1979) (where 
evidence demonstrates that mail is logged in immediately 
upon receipt from the mail carrier, non-logging can “be 
equated with nonreceipt”).  However, one cannot reasonably 
expect individuals to maintain logs of incoming mail.  
Moreover, even if an enterprising (or particularly compulsive) 
individual did maintain a mail log, it would not qualify as a 
“business record” under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and 
the absence of an entry showing receipt would therefore not 
be admissible to show a letter was not received.  30C Michael 
H. Graham, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 7047 (2014 ed.) 
(“Papers kept by an individual solely for personal reasons do 
not qualify as business records for the purposes of Rule 
803(6)[.]”). 
 
 Accordingly, individuals in Lupyan’s position have no 
way of establishing that they did not receive a disputed letter, 
other than to “prove a negative.”  Where ordinary mail is 
used, requiring more than a sworn statement to dispute receipt 
elevates the weak presumption intended by the mail box rule 
to a conclusive presumption that would be equivalent to an 
ironclad rule. 
 
 In this age of computerized communications and 
handheld devices, it is certainly not expecting too much to 
require businesses that wish to avoid a material dispute about 
the receipt of a letter to use some form of mailing that 
includes verifiable receipt when mailing something as 
important as a legally mandated notice.  The negligible cost 
and inconvenience of doing so is dwarfed by the practical 
consequences and potential unfairness of simply relying on 
business practices in the sender’s mailroom.  This is 
particularly evident here, because CCI’s employees had to 
recall the circumstances surrounding a letter that was mailed 
four years earlier.  Where, as here, denial of receipt creates a 
genuine issue of material fact, justice should not give way to 
expediency or the rigid application of a common law 
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presumption that was adopted long before modern forms of 
communication and proof could have even been imagined.  
 
 We therefore conclude that Lupyan’s denial of receipt 
of the Letter is enough to create a genuine issue of material 
fact that must be resolved by a factfinder.  This is particularly 
true when we consider the record in the light most favorable 
to Lupyan, as we must on summary judgment review.  See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 
(noting that credibility determinations are inappropriate at 
summary judgment).
 3  
Accordingly, we reverse the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment on Lupyan’s 
FMLA interference claim, and remand for determination of 
whether she received notice that her leave fell under the 
FMLA.
4
  
 
                                              
3
  Moreover, in addition to her sworn denial of receipt, 
Lupyan—who has since had opportunity to review a copy of 
the Letter—notes that the Letter provides as follows: “You 
notified us that you need to leave beginning 12/4/07 and that 
you expect this leave to continue through October 
3/31/2008.”  Appx. III at 37.  As noted above, Lupyan’s 
revised Request for Leave Form states her return date as April 
1, 2008.   A jury can consider what, if any, ramifications this 
discrepancy has in resolving issues of credibility. 
 
 Lupyan also points to an unsigned Acknowledgment of 
Receipt in her personnel file, which was enclosed with the 
Letter.  While there is no requirement under FMLA that an 
employer obtain a signed Acknowledgment of Receipt from 
an employee to prove that the employee actually received 
their FMLA Notice of Rights, the fact that there is an 
unsigned Acknowledgment of Receipt in her personnel file 
could cause a factfinder to conclude that Lupyan either failed 
to sign and return the Acknowledgment, or that she never 
received the Letter in the first place. 
 
4
  Of course, as the plaintiff, Lupyan still bears the 
underlying burden of persuasion.  Thus, on remand, Lupyan 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she did 
not have notice that she was on FMLA leave. 
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C. Prejudice to Lupyan 
  
 Our inquiry into Lupyan’s interference claim does not 
end with our conclusion that there are factual issues 
surrounding receipt of the Letter that must be resolved.  Even 
if CCI failed to provide timely personal notice of FMLA 
rights, Lupyan must still establish that she was prejudiced by 
the lack of notice.  Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at  89 (noting that 
“FMLA’s comprehensive remedial mechanism” affords no 
relief absent prejudice from a statutory violation).  This 
requires her to demonstrate that, had she been properly 
informed of her FMLA rights, she could have structured her 
leave differently.   Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 145-146; see also 
Capilli v. Whitesell Constr. Co., 271 Fed. Appx. 261, 267 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  
 
 It is undisputed that Lupyan received all of the leave 
she was entitled to under the FMLA.
5
  Indeed, Lupyan did not 
provide a release to return to work without restrictions until 
April 9, 2008, approximately eighteen weeks after she began 
her leave.  However, Lupyan contends that, had she known 
her leave fell under the FMLA, she would have expedited her 
return and rejoined CCI before she exhausted her twelve 
weeks of leave and was effectively terminated.   Appx. II at 
37-38.  If accepted by a jury, that would be sufficient to 
establish the required prejudice under the FMLA.  
Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 142–143 (plaintiff could demonstrate 
prejudice by showing that, had he received notice of his rights 
under the FMLA, “he would have been able to make an 
informed decision about structuring his leave and would have 
structured it, and his plan of recovery, in such a way as to 
preserve the job protection afforded by the Act”).  See also 
Nussbaum v. C.B. Richard Ellis, 171 F. Supp. 2d 377, 385-86 
(D.N.J. 2001) (noting that “the overall intent of the FMLA is 
lost when an employer fails to provide an employee with the 
                                              
5
 According to the record Lupyan’s FMLA leave began 
on or about December 4, 2007, and officially expired twelve 
weeks later, on or about February 26, 2008.  Lupyan first 
informed CCI of her release to return to work on March 13, 
2008, approximately fourteen weeks after she initiated her 
leave. 
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opportunity to make informed decisions about her leave 
options and limitations”).   
 
 Moreover, while corroborating evidence is not 
necessary, Lupyan points to her first doctor’s release, dated 
March 13, 2008, issued only two weeks after her FMLA leave 
expired.  The release does not indicate Lupyan was actually 
unable to return to her job at CCI; instead, it states that she 
“would benefit from a position with minimal student contact 
if at all possible.”  App. Br. at 5.  Thus, while Lupyan’s 
Request for Leave Form contains a projected return date of 
April 1, 2008, the record does not establish that she was not 
able to return to her job before February 26, 2008, when her 
FMLA leave expired. 
 
 The credibility of Lupyan’s statements, that she could 
have returned to work within twelve weeks had she known 
her job was in jeopardy, must also be weighed by the 
factfinder.  See Anderson,  477 U.S. at 255 (noting that 
credibility determinations should not to be made at summary 
judgment).     
 
D. Retaliation 
 
 Lupyan also alleges that she was terminated in 
retaliation for taking FMLA leave, in violation of the Act.  
Lupyan did not submit direct evidence of discriminatory 
behavior, and the District Court appropriately analyzed her 
claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework 
established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973).  See Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. 
Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying McDonnell 
Douglas to FMLA interference claims based on 
circumstantial evidence).  Under that framework, a plaintiff 
challenging an adverse employment decision has the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case.
6
  See McDonnell 
                                              
6
  To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the 
FMLA, Lupyan was required to show that (1) she invoked her 
right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse 
employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally 
related to her invocation of rights.  Lichtenstein , 691 F.3d at 
302. 
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Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  The burden then shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for the decision.  Id.  Once that burden is met, the plaintiff 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.  See 
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  In the summary judgment context, this means that 
once the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason, “the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably 
either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate 
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause 
of the employer's action.”  Fuentes v. Perksie, 32 F.3d 759, 
763 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
 Here, CCI asserted two reasons for terminating 
Lupyan’s employment: (1) she exhausted her FMLA leave; 
and (2) low student enrollment meant that her position was no 
longer needed.  Appx. II at 8.  As to the first reason, we agree 
that Lupyan’s employment legally ended upon expiration of 
her FMLA leave.  See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 85.
7
  However, 
Lupyan’s return outside of the twelve week window does not 
preclude her retaliation claim under the circumstances here. 
“The FMLA’s protection against retaliation is not limited to 
periods in which an employee is on FMLA leave, but 
encompasses the employer’s conduct both during and after 
the employer’s FMLA leave.”  Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare 
System, LLC., 277 F.3d 757, 768-69 (5th Cir. 2001).  The 
nature of retaliation claims distinctly focuses on the 
employer’s conduct and motivations for termination.  
Therefore, an employee is not precluded —as a matter of law 
—from bringing a retaliation claim simply because she 
exceeded the twelve-week FMLA entitlement.  See 
Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302 (noting that FMLA retaliation 
claims require proof of the employer’s retaliatory intent).  
                                              
7
  Moreover, it is in disputable that the first reason is 
causally related to Lupyan’s invocation of her FMLA rights: 
she could not have been “effectively terminated” from her 
position at CCI upon expiration of her designated FMLA 
leave, had she not taken FMLA leave in the first place.   
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Thus, we must scrutinize CCI’s second proffered reason for 
Lupyan’s termination.  
 
 The District Court concluded that, even assuming 
Lupyan could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, she 
“failed to direct [the court] to any evidence from which a 
factfinder could reasonably either: (1) disbelieve CCI’s 
articulated legitimate reason; or (2) believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of her termination.”  Lupyan v. 
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 2:09cv1403, 2011 WL 
4017960 at *8 (W. D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011).  The District Court’s 
conclusion is inconsistent with the record. 
 
 After submitting her full release, Lupyan was advised 
that she was terminated not only because she failed to return 
within twelve weeks, but also because of low student 
numbers.  CCI alleges that enrollment had declined in the 
twelve-month period before Lupyan’s return, and classes had 
been eliminated to such an extent that Lupyan’s position as an 
instructor was no longer needed.  Appx. III at 7-8.  However, 
CCI’s own witness testified that, as a matter of school policy, 
CCI does not “lay off” instructors because of downturns in 
enrollment.  Appx. II at 8-9; Appx. III at 10.  Thus, even if a 
downturn in enrollment had occurred, it was highly unusual 
for CCI to respond by terminating Lupyan’s position.  See 
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 
2000) (noting that one means of establishing the requisite 
causal connection in retaliation claims is setting forth 
evidence showing “inconsistent reasons for terminating the 
employee”).  Given the unusual nature of her termination and 
its proximity to Lupyan’s leave, a jury could reasonably 
conclude that Lupyan’s request for FMLA leave motivated 
this differential treatment. 
 
 Furthermore, despite acknowledging that Lupyan was 
a current employee and not a new hire, one of CCI’s 
witnesses testified that Lupyan was terminated pursuant to a 
“hiring freeze” necessitated by a downturn in enrollment.  
Appx. III at 7-8.  However, another of  CCI’s witnesses 
testified that Lupyan would not have been considered a new 
hire.  Rather, she would have been considered “an employee 
on leave that was being brought back.”  Appx. III at 40.  
  
18 
Indeed, if Lupyan was considered an employee at the time she 
attempted to return to work, it follows that she may not have 
been subject to a “hiring freeze” because she was not being 
“hired” to fill her position.  Moreover, despite the alleged 
school-wide hiring freeze, CCI hired a new instructor (albeit 
in a different department) less than a month after the freeze 
purportedly went into effect.  Appx. II at 14. 
 
 Finally, only eight days before Lupyan was informed 
of both the “hiring freeze” and the year-long downturn in 
enrollment, Thomas told her that she could return to her 
position as long as she provided an unrestricted release 
verifying that she could work without accommodations.   
Appx. I at 27.  
 
 Based on all of the above, we believe that a reasonable 
jury could discredit CCI’s reasons for Lupyan’s termination 
as pretextual.   See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police 
Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that, where 
“the timing of the alleged retaliatory action [is] unusually 
suggestive of retaliatory motive,” a “causal link will be 
inferred.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District 
Court’s contrary conclusion appears based on the court’s 
failure to consider the “record as a whole” in a manner 
favorable to Lupyan.  Farrell, 206 F.3d at 281.  Accordingly, 
we will also reverse the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment on Lupyan’s FMLA retaliation claim. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment to CCI on both the 
retaliation and interference claims and remand to the District 
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
